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Preferences for Truthfulness: 
Heterogeneity among and within Individuals†
By Rajna Gibson, Carmen Tanner, and Alexander F. Wagner*
Standard economic models of self-interested utility maximization, which empha-
size the role of consequences in determining agents’ actions, predict a grim inexora-
bility to all economic systems. These models are based on an assessment of humans 
as self-interested agents who behave dishonestly for cogent reasons. These hypo-
thetical persons prioritize the outcomes of their actions and forgo materially ben-
eficial lying only if strategic or reputational considerations arise. Some researchers, 
such as Bhide and Stevenson (1990), assert that these reputational forces are often 
weak, implying that honesty simply does not seem to pay.
Examples of disastrous dishonesty based on such self-interest abound in the cor-
porate world. Deliberate deception has augmented the economic effects of regula-
tory failure, of a deteriorating macro-economy, and of inadequate models, in, for 
example, the subprime crisis.
Yet, truthfulness also appears to prosper in society. Whistleblowers often jeop-
ardize their careers and friendships when they truthfully reveal the wrongdoing of 
their companies. Some CEOs are regarded as particularly virtuous (Treviño and 
Brown 2004). Numerous journalists risk their lives to report the truth about political 
repression, economic crimes, and human rights violations.
To explain otherwise puzzling behavior both in the field and in experiments, sev-
eral authors have proposed the idea that some people experience intrinsic costs when 
they lie. For example, in a cheap-talk sender-receiver game, Gneezy (2005) found 
that many subjects told the truth.1 Of various possible explanations for this result, he 
1 Similar results on truth telling have been obtained in other studies (Evans, et al. 2001; Sánchez-Pagés; and 
Vorsatz 2007). Only a few researchers, such as Baiman and Lewis (1989), have found that people will lie for even 
just a tiny monetary payoff. See the edited volume by Zak (2008) for numerous additional examples.
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inferred that the most plausible was that “people have non-consequential preferences 
in which they treat the same monetary outcome differently, depending on the process 
that leads up to it” (p. 392). Moreover, in Gneezy’s interpretation, “different people 
weigh these preferences differently” (p. 392). That is, a model in which agents exhibit 
(continuously) heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness could explain his data.
Because Gneezy’s experiment was set in a strategic context, social preferences 
may also have been active. Therefore, Gneezy also emphasized the joint relevance of 
process-dependent preferences and of consequences to oneself and to others.2 But it is 
precisely because both lying aversion and social preferences operated in his experiment 
that the two channels were difficult to isolate. Indeed, Hurkens and Kartik (2009, p. 180) 
showed that Gneezy’s (2005) empirical observations were consistent with the “hypoth-
esis that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will 
lie whenever she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained 
by telling the truth.” Based on this existing evidence, it is, therefore, possible that the 
world is populated, in the spirit of type-based models such as that of Koford and Penno 
(1992), by exactly two fixed types: economic types and ethical types (in Gneezy’s ter-
minology). Alternatively, these two types can, respectively, be characterized as conse-
quentialists (who care about consequences to themselves and to others, but not about 
the process by which these consequences are achieved) and as nonconsequentialists 
(who care only about the process, but not about consequences).
The type–based model and the model with heterogeneous preferences for truthful-
ness lead to very different implications, particularly for agent selection and incen-
tive design. Therefore, it is important to determine which of these two models offers 
a more accurate description of reality.
To address this question, we conducted a decision-theoretic laboratory experiment 
in which each participant was placed in the situation of a CEO who had to announce 
his or her firm’s earnings to a passive market. The participants were informed of the 
true level of earnings. They were also told that falsely reporting higher earnings was 
legal and would lead to higher actual payoffs than honestly announcing the lower 
earnings. We considered that economic types would always lie in our experiment 
because truthfulness was designed to be economically costly; we considered that 
ethical types would always tell the truth. If, by contrast, individuals varied continu-
ously in the extent to which they were driven by preferences for truthfulness, they 
would trade off the economic costs of truthfulness with the costs of lying; those with 
intermediately strong preferences for truthfulness would exhibit the most changes in 
behavior as economic costs changed.
The simplicity of our experimental setup—involving a decision-making situa-
tion with no counterparties —allowed us to isolate motivations for truthtelling that 
are nonstrategic and not driven by social preferences; it permitted us to sidestep 
issues that occur in strategic contexts. Moreover, in our experiment, we observed 
individuals’ behaviors. This setup enabled us to provide evidence, stronger than that 
developed in existing works, regarding heterogeneity in preferences for truthfulness.
2 A long-standing literature considers the role of preferences that depend on process and/or on consequences for 
others; it recognizes that people do not necessarily maximize utility according to the material consequences of their 
actions. For example, Rabin (1995) demonstrated how fairness considerations can explain why people are willing 
to reward or punish others even when this requires a sacrifice of their own well-being.
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We observed that, in a situation where the standard economic model predicts that 
everybody will lie, 32 percent of the participants chose not to do so, thus forgoing 
a larger variable compensation. Importantly, the aggregate percentage of truthtellers 
decreased as the costs of truthfulness increased. Our individual-level regressions imply 
that the marginal effect of a cost increase on the probability of an individual’s telling 
the truth is significantly negative, even after controlling for various demographic and 
psychological factors. These results are at odds with the type-based model but are 
consistent with a model that posits heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness.
Our primary contribution, therefore, is to provide evidence for the notion that peo-
ple occupy a spectrum of preferences for truthfulness rather than only two opposite 
positions.3 As a secondary contribution, we examine potential sources of the hetero-
geneity in preferences for truthfulness. Tendencies towards impression management 
and self-deception offer no explanatory power; however, one measure of a source 
of intrinsic costs of lying, an index of “protected values of truthfulness,” seems to 
organize the data well. We also find substantial evidence of nonseparability between 
this measure of intrinsic costs of lying and economic costs of truthfulness in the util-
ity function. In other words, total preferences for truthfulness display heterogeneity 
not only among, but also within, individuals. We do not have adequate measures of 
other possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying, including, in particular, measures 
of expressive preferences. Therefore, we acknowledge that other preference formu-
lations could potentially explain our empirical evidence.
Section I presents the basic trade-off and the hypotheses. Section II describes 
the experiment. Section III discusses the main results. Section IV explores possible 
sources of intrinsic costs of lying and their interaction with economic costs of truth-
fulness. Section V concludes.
I. The Trade-off
Consider an agent who decides whether to tell the truth, T = 1, or to lie, T = 0. 
Lying, the agent receives a certain income m. There are economic costs of stating the 
truth, for which we use the term ECOST. The agent receives funds m-ECOST when 
he tells the truth. We model preferences for truthfulness by positing that the agent 
also experiences total costs of lying,  C i . (For the moment,  C i is given. We discuss in 
Section IV how these total costs of lying may arise from the interplay between the 
intrinsic costs of lying and the extrinsic economic costs of truthfulness.) If types are 
continuous,  C i can take on any value, positive or negative. By contrast, in the two-
type model, there are only “ethical types” who have  C i = ∞ and “economic types” 
who have  C i = 0. Let the global utility function be defined as
  b(m − ECOST) if T = 1(1)  V i (T ) = {
  bm −  C i if T = 0,
3 Gneezy, Imas, and Madarász (2012) found that participants who lied in a sender-receiver game were more 
likely to later donate to charity than those who chose to tell the truth. This also suggests that there are not simply 
only ethical types and economic types.
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where T is the choice variable.4 For simplicity, and because wealth effects are 
unlikely in our experiment, we assume the agent has a constant marginal utility of 
money b > 0. We also assume that all participants have the same b.5
The difference between the utilities of truthtelling and of lying is given by
(2)  Y i * =  C i − bECOST.
An individual exhibits truthfulness when  Y i * > 0. This implies that truthfulness 
can, in this framework, arise as optimal behavior only if there is a positive total 
cost of lying. While social preferences are known to contribute to behavior (e.g., 
Fehr and Fischbacher 2002, 2003), our experiment is designed to eliminate any 
role for altruism, reciprocity, guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006), 
and related factors, as well as any role for strategic concerns that might arise with 
repeated interaction.
Consider now a population of individual decision makers (whose distribution of 
Ci is not known), each of them facing various economic costs of truthfulness. A 
type-based model, such as that of Koford and Penno (1992), implies that ethical 
types, with their overwhelming preferences for truthfulness, would always choose 
T = 1, and this choice would be invariant to ECOST. Conversely, economic types 
would always lie when profitable. (At ECOST = 0, they would perceive no advan-
tage or disadvantage to either telling the truth or lying; but at all other levels of eco-
nomic costs of truthtelling, the utility difference  Y i * would be negative.) Aggregating 
across the population of individuals, this implies the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS TYP (Type-based model): The fraction of the population telling the 
truth remains constant across varying economic costs of truthfulness.
By contrast, in the model based on heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness, 
where Ci varies continuously throughout the population, varying economic costs 
would lead some individuals with intermediate total lying costs to change their 
behavior. Higher economic costs of truthfulness would then make it less likely that 
an individual would tell the truth. Thus, we have the alternative hypothesis reflecting 
Gneezy’s conjecture:
HYPOTHESIS HET (Model based on heterogeneous preferences for truthful-
ness): The fraction of the population telling the truth varies with economic costs of 
truthfulness.
In Section III, we test these two hypotheses using aggregate behavioral data. 
We also specify an empirical model for individual choice to test the corresponding 
underlying predictions regarding the marginal effect of economic costs of truthful-
ness on individual choice.
4 Truthfulness here is a matter of preference. Alternatively, we could posit a constraint involving a need to main-
tain a minimum level of truthtelling. Within this simple context, the two formulations are identical. Rabin (1995) 
showed that moral preferences and moral constraints can result in different incentives for information collection.
5 It is standard to assume that, abstracting from the preference feature of interest (for example, inequity aver-
sion), all participants have equal marginal utility of money. See, for example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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II. Experimental Method 6
We are interested in situations requiring a choice between telling the truth and 
telling a lie, in which the former decision involves an economic sacrifice. As our 
context, we chose accounting earnings management (henceforth called “earnings 
management”).7 This situation illuminates a real-life conflict: management’s vari-
able compensation is frequently tied to stock price performance, which in turn often 
hinges on earnings announcements. We envisioned a framework in which earnings 
management would be understood to be legal (for example, within GAAP rules) 
although explicitly self-interested and dishonest—a decision-making problem 
focused exclusively on the managerial choice. We required the recipient (the market, 
played by the computer) to accept passively all financial statements. The advantage 
of this approach is that, due to the absence of strategic interactions, we have been 
able to isolate, at least better than in the real world, factors influencing individu-
als’ choices, without monitoring the participants’ thoughts regarding the behavior of 
other players.8
A. Participants and Procedure
A total of 261 participants (median age: 23 years) took part in this online exper-
iment. We recruited participants from undergraduate classes at the University of 
Zurich. Fifty percent of the participants were economics and finance students, 40 
percent psychology students, and 10 percent students from other fields. Forty-two 
percent were women, and 58 percent were men (distributed across the fields). All 
participants were told at the outset that anonymity was ensured.9 They were first 
asked to respond to a few demographic questions and to read some basic instruc-
tions. They were informed that they would individually receive a payment, CHF 
8, for their completed participation in the study, and an additional payment that 
depended on their decisions. After having demonstrated their understanding of the 
(unlabeled) tasks and of the rules of the experiment, the participants completed, 
in randomized orders, the three main parts of the experiment: (i) the truthtelling 
task, (ii) the effort task, and (iii) the measurement of various controls and potential 
6 The full set of instructions is available in the online Appendix. The experiment included other tasks whose 
content and results are not described here for space reasons.
7 Accounting earnings management occurs “when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in struc-
turing transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” 
(Healy and Wahlen 1999). Accounting earnings management can be viewed as a form of lying, which is defined as 
“a statement that one knows to be false” (Grover 2005). Nelson, Elliott, and Tarpley (2003) provide many examples 
collected from auditors.
8 In particular, despite the intuitive appeal and real-world relevance of the strategic games employed in Gneezy 
(2005) and in Hurkens and Kartik (2009), these games come with some interpretational challenges. For instance, 
in sender-receiver games, even telling the truth can be deceptive, because the sender may hope that the receiver will 
not believe the true message that is sent (Sutter 2009). Additionally, Rode (2010) found that decision makers were 
significantly less trusting in a competitive context than in a cooperative context.
9 At the time of the experiment, the exchange rate was about US $1 = CHF 1.15. Most participants received 
payment one week after the experiment. For this purpose, each participant received, before the experiment, a code, 
based on which the experimenter prepared an envelope containing the earnings. Participants received the sealed 
envelopes by indicating their personal codes. It is, therefore, unlikely that a desire to appear honest affected the 
participants’ behavior systematically. Ariely, Bracha, and Meier (2009) document how publicly displayed monetary 
incentives can be less effective in promoting prosocial behavior than privately displayed incentives.
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proxies for intrinsic costs of lying. Finally, all the participants were paid. For sim-
plicity, we describe the procedure for one of the randomized orders of tasks.
 (i)  In the truthtelling task, each participant was placed in the situation of a CEO 
who had to announce earnings per share for the previous quarter. The partici-
pants were told that the variable component of their salaries would depend on 
the earnings they announced. They were also told that the market currently 
anticipated the announcement of 35 cents per share as earnings, but that the 
true earnings were 31 cents per share. The participants were told that they 
could announce earnings of 35 cents per share while remaining within legal 
accounting limits,10 and that the decision would be solely theirs. They were 
also informed that they would be paid an amount based on the CEO com-
pensation (according to their decisions). This additional experimental payoff 
would be converted into real money at the rate of CHF 100,000 = CHF 0.5. 
Importantly, participants earned less when choosing to tell the truth.
The participants were then told they would have to announce their financial state-
ments that day. The truthtelling task questionnaire follows:
Which earnings will you announce?
__ 31 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 60,000 (CHF 0.30).
__ 35 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 31 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 120,000 (CHF 0.60).
__ 35 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 31 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 180,000 (CHF 0.90).
__ 35 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 31 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 240,000 (CHF 1.20).
__ 35 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 31 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
__ 35 cents per share – In this case, your compensation will be CHF 300,000 (CHF 1.50).
A few questions served as a manipulation check to verify that participants 
distinguished between the 31 and 35 cent options. The participants were asked, 
using a five-point scale ranging from −2 to +2, the extent to which they judged 
announcing 31 cents as dishonest versus honest, manipulative versus not manipu-
lative, short term–oriented versus long term–oriented, and associated with per-
sonal benefits versus associated with personal costs. The same was also done for 
the 35-cent announcement option.
 (ii)  Participants engaged in a simple calculation (effort) task.
10 Therefore, risk preferences of individuals did not matter, as their choices were not based on the trade-off 
between the expected benefits and costs of committing a crime.
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 (iii)  We then measured, as potential sources of intrinsic costs of lying (a term 
we introduce formally in Section IV), their tendencies towards impres-
sion management and self-deception, and their levels of protected values. 
Moreover, we also measured their altruistic concerns.
After the experiment, the participants anonymously received their payments of CHF 
8 plus their earnings. The average total payment was slightly less than CHF 30.5.11
B. Variables of Interest
TRUTHFUL CHOICE.—This represented the dependent variable in the truthtell-
ing task, coded as a binary variable that took on the value of 1 if a participant chose 
to announce earnings of 31 cents (the honest option), and the value of 0 if a partici-
pant announced 35 cents (the dishonest option).
ECOST.—This was a within-participants variation. Economic costs of truthfulness 
derived from the amount of money a participant forfeited by announcing 31 cents. 
The ECOST variable took on values from CHF 0 to CHF 1.20 (= 1.50 – 0.30), in 
increments of 30 cents.
IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT and SELF DECEPTION.—Using the stan-
dard Deception Scales (PDS) of Paulhus (1984) in the German version of Musch, 
Brockhaus, and Bröder (2002), we measured individuals’ tendencies to give socially 
desirable responses. These tendencies come in two distinct forms: a tendency to 
deceive others (impression management) and a tendency to deceive oneself (self-
deception). Both are expected to be positively related to intrinsic costs of lying. 
Accordingly, we coded two variables, EXTDECEIT and SELFDECEIT. We scaled 
the measures to be between 0 and 1. Participants who exhibited more socially 
acceptable responses scored higher on both scales.
PROTECTED VALUES (PV ).—The extent to which participants held truthfulness 
as a protected value and, therefore, felt committed to truthtelling was another source 
of intrinsic costs of lying. To measure this source, we used an index developed by 
Tanner, Ryf, and Hanselmann (2009), the details of which are available in the online 
Appendix. This index took on a value between 0 (for an individual with no protected 
values) and 6 (for an individual with maximum protected values). The internal consis-
tency of this scale, as assessed by Cronbach’s α, was very satisfactory (α = 0.86).12
ALTRUISTIC CONCERNS.—We asked participants the extent to which they 
believed that announcing 35 cents had consequences for other stakeholders 
(−2 = hurting other stakeholders to +2 = not hurting other stakeholders). Of 
course, within the strict confines of the experiment, there were no such consequences. 
Nonetheless, this variable was a relevant control for any altruistic preferences or 
11 This amount includes payment for other tasks in the full experiment.
12 Cronbach’s Alpha is a measure of the reliability and the internal consistency of an instrument. The measure 
ranges from 0 to 1 and will generally increase when the correlations between the items increase.
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fairness concerns of the participants which might confound our inferences. Answers 
to this question were coded as the variable 35HURTS.
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROL VARIABLES.—SEX was equal to 1 for female par-
ticipants and to 0 for male participants. AGE was equal to each participant’s age in 
completed years. PSYCHOLOGY was equal to 1 for psychology students (“psy-
chologists”) and to 0 otherwise. OTHER was equal to 1 for participants from fields 
other than psychology and economics and to 0 otherwise. ECONOMICS was the 
omitted category.
III. Main Results
A. Descriptive Evidence
We first confirm, through a manipulation check, that the participants generally 
understood the announcement of 31 cents to be the honest, nonmanipulative action 
that would lead to a personal loss, while the opposite was true of the announcement 
of 35 cents. (See Table 1.)
Table 2 allows a first look at the choices the participants made in the experiment. 
In approximately 42 percent of cases (32 percent when omitting the free-truth situ-
ation), participants chose to announce low earnings, that is, chose not to engage in 
earnings management. By telling the truth, those participants opted to suffer, on aver-
age, effective monetary losses of 11 percent of the maximum total amount they could 
have earned in the truthtelling task or 27 percent of the variable amount they 
could have earned above the guaranteed payout.
The fact that a large proportion of the participants reported the truth, even when 
the conditions opposed it, is consistent with the notion that many individuals have 
positive total costs of lying. By contrast, this finding is inconsistent with the stan-
dard economic model.
B. Reactions to Economic Costs of Truthfulness
In this section, our primary goal is to test the implications of the type-based model, 
which posits that the (participant) population consisted only of “economic types” 
and “ethical types,” against the implications of the model based on heterogeneous 
preferences for truthfulness.
Table 1—Manipulation Checks
31 cents 35 cents t-test
Honest vs. dishonest 1.61 −1.17 26.47
Nonmanipulative vs. manipulative 1.39 −1.14 22.70
Personal financial loss vs. personal financial gain 0.93 −1.25 19.50
Long-term view vs. short-term view 0.99 −1.1 18.53
Notes: Participants answered questions that asked for their assessments of announcing 31 and 35 cents, respectively. 
These questions were on a −2 to +2 scale. After reordering (the direction of the scale varies between questions), a 
value of +2 indicates that the action was seen as honest, nonmanipulative, associated with a personal financial loss, 
and based on a long-term view.
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Table 2, showing aggregate data, reveals substantial variation in the participants’ 
responses as the economic costs of truthfulness changed: with higher economic 
costs, the percentage of participants telling the truth was lower. This is incon-
sistent with the type-based model’s prediction in Hypothesis TYP, according to 
which the fraction of participants who told the truth would have remained constant. 
Formally, a  χ 2 -test strongly rejects the hypothesis that there is a fixed fraction of 
“ethical” types who always tell the truth and a fixed fraction of “economic types” 
who always lie, with nobody differing from these two types. (This is true not only 
of the specific version postulated by Hurkens and Kartik (2009), where exactly half 
of the population always tell the truth and the other half always lie, but also for any 
other fraction between 0 and 1.) When there was no economic cost of truthfulness, 
18 percent of the participants still chose the earnings-management solution. This 
can be explained by recognizing that the model based on heterogeneous prefer-
ences for truthfulness allows agents to have a negative total cost of lying. (The 
manipulation check confirms that this group of people perceived 35 cents as the 
less honest option.)
To investigate statistically the influence of the economic costs of truthfulness 
on individual behavior, we estimate a discrete choice/random utility model (e.g., 
King 1998; Wooldridge 2006). From equation (2), adding a stochastic error and 
re arranging terms, each participant i’s (i = 1, … , 261) latent utility difference 
between truthtelling and lying at direct economic ECOSTj is given by
(3)  Y ij * =  C i − bECOS T j +  ε ij .
Under utility maximization, an observed realization of TRUTHFUL CHOICE,  T ij , 
is related to  Y ij * by the following mechanism:
  1 if  Y ij * ≥ 0(4)  T ij = {  0 if  Y ij * < 0.
In line with standard practice, we assume that ε is independent of the explanatory 
variables X. By assuming that ε has the logistic distribution, one obtains the logit 
model, which is the main specification on which we focus. After relabeling and 
combining coefficients,
(5) Pr ( T ij = 1 | X) = Λ[  β 0 +  β E ECOS T j ],
Table 2—Behavior across Economic Costs of Truthfulness
ECOST =  
 CHF 0
ECOST =  
CHF 0.3
ECOST =  
CHF 0.6
ECOST =  
CHF 0.9
ECOST =  
CHF 1.2 Total
Total except 
ECOST = 0
   82.0 52.1 31.4 23.0 21.1 41.9 31.9
Note: This table presents the percentages of participants announcing 31 cents of earnings per share across the vari-
ous economic cost of stating the truth (ECOST) conditions.
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where Λ(∙) is the logistic cumulative distribution function.13 The coefficient vector is 
estimated by maximum likelihood. If   βE < 0, participants react negatively overall to 
economic costs. The coefficient   β0 here gives the average  C i in the data for zero eco-
nomic costs of truthfulness. (In Section IV, we explore sources of variation in  C i and 
we discuss that, besides the direct effect of reducing the attractiveness of truthfulness, 
ECOST may have an indirect effect through the total costs of lying.) The standard errors 
correct for possible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering at the indi-
vidual level. (Recall that participants went through all five economic cost situations.)
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. Consistent with the fact that 
many individuals did, in fact, tell the truth, the constant term is positive. Importantly, 
ECOST is a highly significant determinant of the relative attractiveness of truthful-
ness and lying for an individual. Indeed, the implied marginal effect of ECOST is 
powerful: A 30-cent increase in ECOST was associated with a 16.9 percent decrease 
in truthtelling.14 Together with the observations made in Table 2, this finding sup-
ports Hypothesis HET.
Column 2 of Table 3 adds individual-level controls. The main result for ECOST 
remains unchanged. We observe some interesting additional findings. First, women 
appeared to be more likely to tell the truth, as did students in fields outside of psy-
chology and economics. Second, given the decision-theoretic nature of the experi-
ment, altruistic and distributional concerns, as well as attempts to live up to others’ 
expectations so as to avoid guilt, should not have affected behavior in this experi-
ment. Yet, we note that 35HURTS does enter significantly in this baseline regression. 
This suggests one of two possibilities. Either participants’ altruistic concerns drove 
behavior, or 35HURTS was correlated with some general differences in preferences 
that were, in turn, correlated with intrinsic costs of lying and, thus, reflected varia-
tion in a variable omitted in column 2. As Section IV shows, the latter explanation 
is corroborated by the data.
The conclusions we draw from these main results are simple but important. 
Hurkens and Kartik (2009) demonstrated that Gneezy’s (2005) data would be con-
sistent with a population of pure opportunists, who always lie, and pure ethical 
types, who always tell the truth (as in Koford and Penno 1992). However, the pres-
ent evidence of changeability in truthtelling behavior and of significant sensitivity to 
economic costs associated with truthfulness rejects Hypothesis TYP and is in direct 
contrast to the implications of a type-based model.
IV. Sources of Heterogeneity in Total Costs of Lying
We have established that the participants in our experiment showed more variation 
in their total costs of lying than if they had belonged to one of just two fixed extreme 
types. In this section, we expand on these findings by considering various potential 
sources of the variation among individuals in total costs of lying. Moreover, this 
13 If ε is normally distributed, one obtains the probit model. As is typical in econometric applications, the 
two models yield virtually identical inferences.
14 In the real world, managers are indeed faced with substantial cross-sectional and time-series variation in the 
economic cost of truthtelling. Our results are consistent with findings by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), who 
showed that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported earnings was more pronounced at firms where 
CEO compensation depended more on the stock price.
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extension allows us to provide further evidence refuting the type-based model; in 
particular, we document that there is also heterogeneity within individuals (across 
situations) in total costs of lying.
A. Enhanced Model
We consider two constituent sources of heterogeneity in total costs of lying. First, 
these costs are driven by individuals’ intrinsic costs of lying (ICOLi ). Second, we 
Table 3—Determinants of Earnings Management Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economic cost of no earnings −2.35*** −2.50*** −2.75*** −6.10*** −5.22***
 management (ECOST) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (1.38) (1.43)
Sex (1: Female, 0: Male) — 0.46* 0.30 0.30 0.39
  (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30)
Age (years) — −0.02 −0.03 −0.03 −0.01
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Psychology (1: Yes, 0: No) — 0.25 0.03 0.05 −0.13
  (0.29) (0.31) (0.31) (0.34)
Other studies (1: Yes, 0: No) — 0.66* 0.24 0.27 0.07
  (0.38) (0.40) (0.40) (0.44)
Altruistic concerns — 0.41*** 0.22** 0.12 −0.04
 (35HURTS) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Impression management tendency — — 0.50 −0.07 0.66
 (EXTDECEIT) (0.97) (0.87) (1.13)
Self-deception tendency — — 0.02 0.08 −1.07
 (SELFDECEIT) (1.03) (0.97) (1.25)
Protected values (PV) — — 0.73*** 0.36*** 0.45**
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.19)
35HURTS × ECOST — — — 0.18 0.35
  (0.21) (0.24)
EXTDECEIT × ECOST — — — 1.18 0.14
  (1.59) (1.61)
SELFDECEIT × ECOST — — — −0.66 0.79
  (1.74) (1.78)
PV × ECOST — — — 0.75*** 0.57**
  (0.22) (0.25)
Constant 1.00*** 0.88 −1.56 0.16 −0.61
  (0.11) (0.66) (1.16) (1.11) (1.26)
Observations 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,044
Number of participants 261 261 261 261 261
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.19
Pseudo log-likelihood −757.6 −719.7 −667.4 −655.7 −531.8
Likelihood-ratio test statistic
 (χ2, p-value)
259.6
(<0.01)
335.4
(<0.01)
440.0
(<0.01)
463.4
(<0.01)
243.6
(<0.01)
Wald test statistic
 (χ2, p-value)
183.9
(<0.01)
211.0
(<0.01)
222.8
(<0.01)
204.8
(<0.01)
107.1
(<0.01)
Notes: This table presents coefficients of logit regressions. The dependent variable is TRUTHFUL CHOICE. The 
explanatory variables are described in the text. Columns 1 to 4 use data from all ECOST situations. Column 5 omits 
the free truth (ECOST = CHF 0) situation. Robust standard errors, obtained by clustering at the individual level, 
appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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also allow the situation, that is, the economic costs of truthfulness or the extrinsic 
incentives for lying, ECOSTj, to influence the total costs of lying. Adjusting nota-
tion, we posit that total costs of lying may vary both among and within individuals, 
and we now write  C ij =  C ij (ICO L i , ECOS T j ). Since all participants encountered 
the same ECOST situations, the evidence on heterogeneous total costs of lying pro-
vided in Section III necessarily implies that there is heterogeneity in ICOLi . Next, 
the intrinsic costs of lying and the economic incentives for lying (economic costs 
of truthfulness) may enter  C ij separably or nonseparably. Indeed, whether intrinsic 
preferences and extrinsic incentives interact in determining total preferences for a 
certain action has implications that extend beyond the scope of the current study; 
see, for example, Bowles and Polanía-Reyes (2012) for a discussion of how incen-
tives to contribute to public goods may affect social preferences. In order to capture 
both possibilities, we consider, for parsimony, a simple parametric specification:
(6)  C ij (ICO L i , ECOS T j ) =  γ 0 +  γ 1 ICO L i +  γ 2 ECOS T j +  γ 3 ICO L i ECOS T j ,
implying
(7)  Y ij * =  C i − bECOS T j +  ε ij 
 =  γ 0 +  γ 1 ICO L i +  ( γ 2 − b ) ECOS T j +  γ 3 ICO L i ECOS T j +  ε ij 
and, with the maintained distributional assumptions,
(8) Pr ( T ij = 1 | X) = Λ[  β 0 +  β I ICO L i +  β E ECOS T j +  β IE ICO L i ECOS T j ],
where   β0 ,   βI ,   βE , and   βIE are the implied estimates for the model parameters  γ 0 ,  γ 1 , ( γ 2 − b), and  γ 3 , respectively.
B. Interpreting the Model Coefficient Estimates
Naturally,  C ij is expected to be increasing in ICO L i , so that we predict   βI > 0. 
This coefficient thus allows us to test whether a candidate measure of ICOL helps 
explain heterogeneity among individuals in total costs of lying. Moreover, specifica-
tion (6) allows for two channels through which heterogeneity in total preferences 
for truthfulness within individuals enters. First, it seems reasonable to postulate that 
C ij is increasing in ECOST so that individuals associate higher monetary stakes with 
a stronger preference to tell the truth. Given that the parameters b and  γ 2 are not 
identified by the present approach,   βE < 0 tells us only that  C ij is not increasing in 
ECOST at a rate greater than marginal utility b. Second, heterogeneity of prefer-
ences within individuals for truthfulness can unambiguously be detected by con-
sidering the interaction term  β IE . Under the discrete-choice model’s assumptions, a 
significant interaction term provides further evidence against the notion, posited by 
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the type-based model, that there are two fixed types.15 Specifically, a positive inter-
action term arises if the intrinsic costs of lying are more important in determining 
total preferences for truthfulness when the stakes (ECOST) are higher. An equiva-
lent interpretation (useful in settings where an agent can choose the size of the lie) 
is that individuals with stronger intrinsic costs of lying perceive “larger” lies, which 
yield larger economic benefits, as less attractive and will, thus, tell “smaller” lies. A 
negative interaction term instead arises if the source of the intrinsic costs of lying is 
relatively less influential at higher stakes. If the coefficient on the interaction is zero, 
the economic costs of truthtelling are perceived identically by all agents, regardless 
of the strength of their intrinsic costs of lying, ICOLi. In that case, all agents’ utili-
ties would react identically to changes in the economic costs, even though heteroge-
neous ICO L i would imply that some would report the truth while others would lie 
at a given ECOST.16
C. Results
We first consider three possible sources of intrinsic costs of lying, ICOLi, for which 
survey measures are available to us, and we then discuss other possible drivers of 
behavior. The descriptive statistics for EXTDECEIT, SELFDECEIT, and PV shown 
in Table 4 indicate that there is wide variation in these three variables, suggesting 
that they could potentially explain the observed variation in truthtelling behavior. 
In Table 3, we test whether this is the case. We allow each possible source to affect 
behavior both separably from economic costs and jointly by way of an interaction.
First, participants may have developed an interest in impressing the experimenter 
by appearing honest and nongreedy (e.g., Fischbacher and Heusi 2008); this would 
act like a preference for truthfulness. Given the design of the experiment, in which 
we took great care to make the responses anonymous, this is very unlikely to have 
occurred. Indeed, EXTDECEIT is not significant in any of the regressions, and nei-
ther is the interaction term with ECOST.
15 Alternatively, if the true utility function has a separable form but the assumption of weak exogeneity of the 
error term  ε ij does not hold, then the interaction term in the model may serve as an instrument to correct for correla-
tion between the explanatory variables (ICOLi and ECOSTj) and the error term  ε ij . The interaction term can serve 
as an instrument because it arises as one of the terms in the second-order Taylor-series expansion of the random 
utility function (with violated weak exogeneity). It captures jointly the effects of both explanatory variables. One 
anonymous referee provided an example in which 90 percent of individuals make deterministic decisions based on 
an additively separable utility function, i.e., they tell the truth when Ci = ICO L i is greater than ECOST, and they 
lie when ICO L i is smaller than ECOST. Ten percent of individuals make decision errors; that is, they tell the truth 
although ECOST is greater than ICO L i , and they lie even when ICO L i is greater than ECOST. In simulated data, 
the referee showed that a logit regression (which is a misspecified model under the assumptions made) may yield a 
significant interaction term on ECOST and intrinsic costs of lying, even in this setting. In the referee’s example, the 
error term is not independent of the observable variables. Thus, the interaction term becomes significant in this set-
ting because it is an instrumental variable for an omitted variable. We conclude that, even if the true utility function 
is separable, researchers may well want to use a nonseparable reduced form because this specification is robust to 
the violation of the assumption of weak exogeneity of the error term, such as occurs in decision errors of the form 
proposed by the referee.
16 When testing for nonseparability (that is, for the significance of the interaction term), we consider coefficients, 
rather than marginal effects, from the logit regressions. Recall that marginal effects in a logit regression are given 
by Λ(β′ X)(1 − Λ(β′ X))β, where Λ(·) is the logistic cumulative distribution function giving the initial probability 
of truthfulness. Those with high (low) ICOL have high (low) initial probabilities of truthfulness. Thus, the highest 
marginal effects of ECOST on behavior are likely to be found in the middle range, and smaller marginal effects are 
likely to be found among those with high intrinsic costs. Analyzing coefficients instead allows us to consider the 
hypothetical case of participants who would display identical initial probabilities of reporting the truth.
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Second, it is possible that participants deceived themselves by making the “right” 
choices. However, SELFDECEIT is also not significant in any of the regressions, 
and neither is the interaction term with ECOST.
Third, we consider the possibility that moral values were a source of the intrinsic 
costs of lying. While many moral concepts are potentially relevant, we focus on 
protected values (PV ). The literature that has developed the theory of these values 
emphasizes that protected values are nonconsequentialist and induce a resistance 
to engaging in actions that would violate moral values, reducing the attractiveness 
of any financial gains obtained through such actions.17 That is, the economic costs 
of truthfulness matter less to those who hold stronger protected values of truth-
fulness; those people are trade-off resistant. This idea naturally translates into a 
functional form for  C i that is nonseparable into intrinsic (moral) costs of lying and 
economic costs of truthfulness.
Column 3 of Table 3 shows that PV of truthfulness was a highly significant predic-
tor of behavior in the experiment. A one-point increase in PV was associated with a 
17.4 percent increase in the probability of truthtelling, holding the other variables at 
their means. In column 4, we obtain a positive, significant coefficient on the interac-
tion term between PV and ECOST. This is evidence that, conditional on the correct-
ness of the discrete choice (logit) model’s specification, the data are consistent with 
nonseparability of the economic incentives and this measure of intrinsic costs of lying. 
That is, the data confirm that there is heterogeneity within individuals’ total costs of 
lying, again inconsistent with the type-based model’s assumption.
Note that   βE +   βIE P V i is negative even when evaluated at PV = 6. Thus, in the 
cross-section of participants, the presence of a strong protected value of truthfulness 
lessened, but did not eliminate, the relevance of the economic costs associated with 
the earnings management decision. With PV in the regression, the significance of 
the demographic controls vanishes. It is also noteworthy that, as soon as we include 
the interaction term with PV, 35HURTS is no longer significant.18 Finally, as shown 
17 See, for example, Baron and Spranca (1997); Tetlock et al. (2000); and Tanner, Medin, and Iliev (2008). The 
source of protected values is modeled by Bénabou and Tirole (2011) as a need of agents to invest in their identity. 
For the strongest form of PV, “sacred” values and taboos, see in particular Section V of their paper.
18 This is as expected, given the setup of this experiment, and it suggests that the significance of 35HURTS in the 
earlier regressions stems from the fact that this variable (as well as the underlying social-preferences intensity of the 
individual) is correlated with intrinsic costs of lying. 35HURTS has a positive correlation with PV of 0.34. Within 
our experimental setup, we are unable to address any possible fundamental relationship between protected values 
and altruistic concerns, so we leave this to future research.
Table 4—Descriptive Statistics of Important Explanatory Variables
  Mean Median SD Min. Max.
Altruistic concerns (35HURTS) 0.74 1.00 1.07 −2.00 2.00
Tendency towards impression management 
 (EXTDECEIT )
0.49 0.50 0.13 0.16 0.81
Tendency towards self-deception 
 (SELFDECEIT )
0.64 0.63 0.12 0.24 1.00
Protected values (PV ) 3.82 3.78 1.03 0.00 6.00
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for our measure of altruistic concerns and for three candidate mea-
sures of intrinsic costs of lying. N = 261.
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in column 5, we also find that our results continue to hold in the subsample without 
the free-truth situation.
We emphasize that, despite these findings, one cannot conclude that PV has a 
stronger claim to organizing the data than plausible alternatives. For example, par-
ticipants may be driven by nonconsequentialist preferences that attach expressive 
utility to low-stakes acts or decisions that substantiate or confirm personal identity. 
This expressive-preferences concept was developed in the political science litera-
ture to explain why citizens vote despite an apparent lack of economic incentive 
(Buchanan 1954; Tullock 1971). Expressive preferences have been experimen-
tally documented to play a role in hypothetical choice situations, for example, by 
Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni (2009). While, in the formulation of these 
authors, expressive preferences (EP) enter utility separably from economic costs, 
it is conceivable that EP also interact with incentives so that nonseparability arises. 
To the extent that the PV survey implicitly measures EP, and conditional on the cor-
rectness of the statistical model’s specification, the results on the interaction term 
imply that EP may, in the range of economic stakes considered in this experiment, 
become more important in creating a difference in the perceived attractiveness of 
truthfulness and lying as the stakes increase.19 Overall, the evidence available from 
this experiment does not allow us to discriminate definitively between EP and PV 
as possible sources of heterogeneity in agents’ lying behaviors. Additional factors 
relevant in the real world are also not addressed here. For example, intrinsic costs 
of lying may also be due to an internal reward mechanism for truthfulness that is 
activated when individuals are, for example, asked to recall the Ten Commandments 
or to sign an honor code (e.g., Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 2008).
D. Further Results and Robustness
Conceivably, participants may have worried about the wealth of the experiment-
ers, which would show up in systematic variation in their choices in the effort task. 
But there is no observable relationship between the participants’ levels of effort in 
that task and their PV, 35HURTS, or socially acceptable responding. This finding 
also confirms that the experimental design did not simply produce the same pattern 
of results in the truthtelling and the effort tasks. Moreover, our results are robust to 
controlling for investment experience, and to variations in samples and estimation 
methods. All these additional results are available upon request.
V. Conclusion
In this study, we examined individuals who were exposed to a simple but realistic 
trade-off: they could tell the truth and suffer economic costs of truthfulness, or they 
could lie and potentially incur intrinsic costs of lying. In our setting, there was no 
strategic incentive to tell the truth; the participants had no counterparty, no notion of 
a repeated game, no legal obligation, and no risk of being punished.
19 Conceptually, EP may also be related to tendencies towards self-deception, though the previous results suggest 
that a standard measure of such tendencies does not explain behavior in this experiment.
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The experimental results unambiguously reject a type-based model. That is, 
the results refute Hypothesis TYP, that there exist only “the Ethical” (who care 
so much about the rightfulness of the process that they always tell the truth) and 
“the Economic” (who care only about their material payoffs and, thus, always lie 
when profitable). Instead, this paper supports Hypothesis HET, reflecting Gneezy’s 
(2005) conjecture of continuous heterogeneity of preferences for truthfulness: peo-
ple balance process against consequences in a range of different ways. Moreover, 
we provide evidence that preferences for truthfulness are nonseparable in intrinsic 
preferences and economic incentives. In sum, our findings point to heterogeneity, 
both among and within individuals, in their preferences for truthfulness.
This experiment cannot definitively identify the ultimate source(s) of the intrinsic 
costs of lying. Nor can it state whether the suggested preferences for truthfulness 
would also be at work at much higher stakes (as the protected-values explanation 
implies) or whether the validity of the results is limited to relatively low-stakes set-
tings (as the expressive-preferences explanation suggests). Future research may be 
fruitfully conducted to answer these important questions.
To the extent that preferences for truthfulness apply in a wide range of settings, 
the results obtained in this study have implications regarding the effectiveness of 
methods to screen agents for their preferences for truthfulness, as well as implica-
tions for the optimal setting of incentive contracts.
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